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ABSTRACT
Modigliani and Cohn [1979]  hypothesize that the stock market suffers from money illusion,
discounting real cash flows at nominal discount rates. While previous research has focused on the
pricing of the aggregate stock market relative to Treasury bills, the money-illusion hypothesis also
has implications for the pricing of risky stocks relative to safe stocks. Simultaneously examining the
pricing of Treasury bills, safe stocks, and risky stocks allows us to distinguish money illusion from
any change in the attitudes of investors towards risk. Our empirical resuts support the hypothesis that














Do people suﬀer from money illusion, confusing nominal dollar values with real pur-
chasing power? When the diﬀerence between real and nominal quantities is small
and stakes are relatively low, equating the nominal dollar amounts with real values
provides a convenient and eﬀective rule of thumb. Therefore, it seems plausible that
people often ignore the rate of inﬂation in processing information for relatively small
decisions.1
Modigliani and Cohn [1979] hypothesize that stock-market investors may also suf-
fer from a particular form of money illusion, incorrectly discounting real cash ﬂows
with nominal discount rates. An implication of such an error is that time-variation
in the level of inﬂation causes the market’s subjective expectation of the future equity
premium to deviate systematically from the rational expectation. Thus when inﬂa-
tion is high (low), the rational equity-premium expectation is higher (lower) than the
market’s subjective expectation, and the stock market is undervalued (overvalued).
The claim that stock market investors suﬀer from money illusion is a particularly in-
triguing and controversial proposition, as the stakes in the stock market are obviously
very high.
Nevertheles, recent time-series evidence suggests that the stock market does suﬀer
from money illusion of Modigliani and Cohn’s variety. Sharpe [2002] and Asness
[2000] ﬁnd that stock dividend and earnings yields are highly correlated with nominal
bond yields. Since stocks are claims to cash ﬂows from real capital and inﬂation is the
main driver of nominal interest rates, this correlation makes little sense, a point made
recently by Ritter and Warr [2002], Asness [2003], and Campbell and Vuolteenaho
[2004]. These aggregate studies suﬀer from one serious weakness, however. Inﬂation
may be correlated with investors’ attitudes towards risk, which directly inﬂuence
stock prices even if investors do not suﬀer from money illusion. To the extent these
1The term “money illusion” was coined by John Maynard Keynes early in the 20th Century. In
1928, Irving Fisher gave the subject a thorough treatment in his book ”The Money Illusion.” Since
then numerous papers have described implications of money illusion to test for its existence. The
most widely discussed of these implications is stickiness in wages and prices (see Gordon 1983 for
a review of the evidence on this topic). Although money illusion can exist even in the absence of
inﬂation, inﬂation is central to most money illusion stories. Fisher and Modigliani (1978) catalog
the ways in which inﬂation could aﬀect the real economy, with money illusion as one important source
of real eﬀects. Shaﬁr, Diamond and Tversky (1997) examine in detail potential eﬀects of money
illusion and present evidence on these eﬀects along with a theory of the psychological underpinnings
of the illusion.
1aggregate studies fail to fully control for risk, the results may confound the impact of
risk attitudes and money illusion.
Our novel tests explore the cross-sectional asset-pricing implications of the Modigliani-
Cohn money-illusion hypothesis. Simultaneously examining the pricing of Treasury
bills, safe stocks, and risky stocks allows us to distinguish money illusion from chang-
ing attitudes of investors towards risk. The key insight underlying our tests is that
money illusion will have a symmetric eﬀect on all stocks’ yields, regardless of their
exposure to systematic risk. In contrast, the impact of investor risk attitudes on a
stock’s yield will be proportional to the stock’s risk, as risky stocks’ yields will be
aﬀected much more than safe stocks’ yields will be. This insight allows us to cleanly
separate the two competing eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that investors use the logic of the Sharpe-Lintner capital
asset pricing model [CAPM, Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965] to measure the riskiness of a
stock and to determine its required risk premium. According to the CAPM, a stock’s
beta with the market is its sole relevant risk measure. In the absence of money illusion
(and other investor irrationalities), the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts that the risk
compensation for one unit of beta among stocks, which is also called the slope of
the security market line, is always equal to the rationally expected premium of the
market portfolio of stocks over short-term bills. For example, if a risky stock has a
beta of 1.5 and the rationally expected equity premium is 4 percent, then that stock
should have a rationally expected return of the Treasury-bill yield plus 6 percent.
Conversely, a safe stock with a beta of 0.5 should only earn a 2 percent premium over
Treasury bills, and the risky stock will therefore return a premium of 4 percent over
t h es a f es t o c k .
The joint hypothesis of money illusion and the CAPM oﬀers a sharp, quantitative
prediction. We show that money illusion implies that, when inﬂation is low or neg-
ative, the compensation for one unit of beta among stocks is larger (and the security
market line steeper) than the rationally expected equity premium. Conversely, when
inﬂation is high, the compensation for one unit of beta among stocks is lower (and
the security market line shallower) than what the overall pricing of stocks relative to
bills would suggest. In our above example, suppose that high inﬂation leads money-
illusioned investors, who expect a 4 percent equity premium, to undervalue the stock
market so that the rational expectation of the equity premium is 7 percent. Then
these investors will price the risky stock to yield only a 4 percent return premium
over the safe stock. Consequently, when inﬂation is high, the average realized equity
2premium (7 percent) will be higher than the average return premium of the risky
stock over the safe stock (4 percent).
Our empirical tests support this hypothesis. First, as an illustration, we sort the
months in our 1927-2001 sample into quartiles based on lagged inﬂation and examine
the pricing of beta-sorted portfolios in these quartiles. The slope of the solid line in
Figure 1 denotes the price of risk implied by the pricing of the overall stock market
relative to that of short-term bills, i.e, the equity premium that a rational investor
should have expected. The dashed line is the security market line, the slope of which
is the price of risk implied by the pricing of high-risk stocks relative to that of low-risk
stocks. As predicted by the money-illusion hypothesis, the ﬁgure shows that during
months that are preceded by inﬂation in the lowest quartile of our sample, the relation
between average returns and CAPM betas is steeper than the slope predicted by the
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM and no money illusion. Conversely, during months that are
preceded by inﬂation in the highest quartile of our sample, the security market line
estimated from the cross-section of beta-sorted portfolios is much shallower than the
expected equity premium.
Second, we introduce a new method for estimating the excess slope and excess
intercept of the security market line among stocks, relative to the predictions of the
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. Our statistical test combines Fama-MacBeth [1973] cross-
sectional and Black-Jensen-Scholes [1972] time-series regressions to solve for the excess
slope and excess intercept as a function of the betas and conditional alphas from the
time-series regression’s parameters. The idea behind this statistical test is exactly
the same as the one illustrated in Figure 1, but allows for a convenient and powerful
statistical hypothesis test. Our tests indicate that the excess intercept of the security
market line comoves positively and the excess slope negatively with inﬂation, as
predicted by the Modigliani-Cohn money-illusion hypothesis.
At ﬁrst, it may seem incredible that stock-market investors, with trillions of dollars
at stake, make such a pedestrian mistake. Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, we
need not look any further than to the leading practitioner model of equity valuation,
the so-called “Fed model2,” to ﬁnd corroborating evidence of stock-market investors
falling prey to money illusion. The Fed model relates the yield on stocks to the
yield on nominal bonds. Practitioners argue that the bond yield plus a risk premium
deﬁnes a “normal” yield on stocks, and that the actual stock yield tends to revert
2Despite this name, the model has absolutely no oﬃcial or special status within the Federal
Reserve system.
3to this normal yield. Consistent with this practitioner argument, Sharpe [2002],
Asness [2000], and Campbell and Vuolteenaho [2004] ﬁnd that the Fed model is quite
successful as an empirical description of aggregate stock prices — prices are set as if the
market used the Fed model to price stocks. Logically, however, the Fed model is on
weak grounds, as it is based on precisely the money-illusion error noted by Modigliani
and Cohn.
Even if most stock-market investors confuse nominal and real quantities, could
a small number of wealthy and rational arbitrageurs still eliminate any potential
mispricing? We believe that rational arbitrageurs would be very conservative in
accomodating supply and demand due to money illusion. The Sharpe ratio (the
expected excess return divided by the standard deviation of excess return) of a bet
against the money-illusion crowd is likely to be relatively low, because one can only
make a single bet at a time and because the mispricing may be corrected very slowly.
This potential slow correction of mispricing is a particularly important limiting fac-
tor of arbitrage, as any attempt to correct the inﬂation-related mispricing exposes
the arbitrageur to the uncertain development of the stock market’s fundamentals.
Mispricing that corrects slowly necessarily requires long holding periods for arbitrage
positions along with signiﬁcant exposure to volatility, as the variance of fundamental
risk grows linearly in time. In fact, had a rational arbitrageur bet against money
illusion by buying stocks on margin in the early 1970’s, his proﬁts would have been
negative for more than a decade. As Modigliani and Cohn noted in 1977: “On the
other hand, those experts of rational valuation who could correctly assess the extent
of the undervaluation of equities, had they acted on their assessment in the hope of
acquiring riches, would have more than likely ended up with substantial losses.” In
summary, mispricing caused by money illusion has precisely those characteristics that
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest eﬀectively prevent arbitrage activity.
2 Money illusion and its implications
2.1 Modigliani and Cohn’s [1979] money-illusion hypothesis
The correct application of the present-value formula discounts nominal cash ﬂows at
nominal discount rates or real cash ﬂows at real discount rates. Modigliani and Cohn
[1979] propose that stock-market investors, but not bond-market investors, suﬀer from
4money illusion, eﬀectively discounting real cash ﬂows at nominal rates.
What mechanism could cause the bond market to correctly reﬂect inﬂation, while
the stock market suﬀers from money illusion? According to the Modigliani-Cohn
hypothesis, money illusion is due to the diﬃculty of estimating long-term future
growth rates of cash ﬂows. Consider an investor who thinks in nominal terms. Since
nominal bonds have cash ﬂo w st h a ta r ec o n s t a n ti nt h o s et e r m s ,e s t i m a t i n gag r o w t h
rate for bonds is not diﬃcult. In contrast, the task of estimating the long-term
expected cash-ﬂow growth for stocks is far from trivial.
For example, suppose that this investor erroneously assumes that long-term earn-
ings and dividend growth are constant in nominal terms, and uses all past historical
data to estimate a long-term growth rate for a stock. Of course a more reasonable
assumption would be that expected long-term growth is constant in real terms. If
expected long-term growth is constant in real terms, yet the investor expects it to
be constant in nominal terms, then in equilibrium stocks will be undervalued when
inﬂation is high and overvalued when inﬂation is low.
The basic intuition of the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis can easily be captured
by examining a money-illusioned investors approach to stock valuation. Consider
the classic “Gordon growth model” [Williams 1938, Gordon 1962] that equates the




= R − G,
where R is the long-term discount rate and G is the long-term growth rate of divi-
dends. R and G c a ne i t h e rb o t hb ei nn o m i n a lt e r m so rb o t hi nr e a lt e r m s ,b u tt h e
Gordon growth model does not allow mixing and matching nominal and real vari-
ables. If the expected returns are constant, the discount rate is exactly equal to
the expected return on the asset. If conditional expected returns vary over time,
however, the discount rate is only approximately equal to the long-horizon expected
holding period return on the asset.
The Gordon growth model can also be thought of in terms of the investor’s ﬁrst-
order condition. If an investor is at the optimum portfolio allocation, then the
discount rate or expected return R on stocks must equal the yield on bonds plus a
premium due to the higher covariance of stock returns with the investor’s consump-
tion. If an otherwise optimizing investor suﬀers from money illusion of Modigliani
and Cohn’s variety, then he thinks of R in nominal terms and expects G to be con-
5stant in nominal terms. If the inﬂation is time varying, however, the assumption
of constant nominal G doesn’t make any sense, as it would imply a wildly variable
real G. In real terms, there is no obvious reason why either R or G should change
mechanically with expected inﬂation, if the consumer is rational.3
If stock-market investors suﬀer from money illusion and expect constant long-term
growth in nominal terms, what will happen when inﬂation rises? Higher nominal
interest rates resulting from inﬂation are then used by stock market participants to
discount unchanged expectations of future nominal dividends. The dividend-price
ratio moves with the nominal bond yield because stock market investors irrationally
fail to adjust the nominal growth rate G to match the nominal discount rate R.F r o m
the perspective of a rational investor, stock are thus undervalued when inﬂation is
high and overvalued when inﬂation is low. A single small rational investor, facing a
market populated by money-illusioned investors, would then tilt his portfolio towards
stocks when inﬂa t i o ni sh i g ha n da w a yf r o ms t o c k sw h e ni n ﬂa t i o ni sl o w ,s ot h a tt h e
equilibrium risk premium of stocks would be justiﬁed by stock returns’ covariance
with his consumption.
To adapt the notation to conform with our subsequent empirical tests, ﬁrst sub-
tract the riskless interest rate from both the discount rate and the growth rate of
dividends. We deﬁne the excess discount rate as Re ≡ R − Rf and the excess divi-
dend growth rate as Ge ≡ G−Rf, where all quantities should again be either nominal
or real. As we are considering the possibility that some investors are irrational, we
follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho [2004] and distinguish between the subjective ex-
pectations of irrational investors (superscript SUBJ) and the objective expectations
of rational investors (superscript OBJ).
As long as irrational investors simply use the present value formula with an erro-














In words, the dividend yield has three components: (1) the negative of objectively
3Some business-cycle dynamic (such as Fama’s [1981] proxy hypothesis) might create a correlation
of near-term discount rates and/or growth rates with inﬂation; however, such movements are a priori
unlikely to move long-term discount rates and/or growth rates much.
6expected excess dividend growth, (2) the subjective risk premium expected by irra-
tional investors, and (3) a mispricing term due to a divergence between the objective
(i.e, rational) and subjective (i.e, irrational) growth forecast, ε ≡ Ge,OBJ − Ge,SUBJ.
Notice that mispricing, ε,i ss p e c i ﬁed in terms of excess yield, with ε < 0 indicating
overpricing and ε > 0 underpricing. Notice also that the Gordon growth model
requires that the expectational error in long-term growth rates, Ge,OBJ −Ge,SUBJ,b e
equal to the expectational error in long-term expected returns, Re,OBJ − Re,SUBJ.
Campbell and Vuolteenaho [2004] formalize the Modigliani-Cohn money-illusion
story by specifying that mispricing or expectational error is a linear function of past
smoothed inﬂation:




e,SUBJ = γ0 + γ1π,
where π is the expected inﬂation and γ1 > 0. If one takes the Modigliani-Cohn
hypothesis literally, one could argue that γ1 =1 , i.e., inﬂation is (irrationally) fully
priced into stock yields. The case in which γ1 =1is consistent with the simple
form of money illusion in which investors assume that the future expected cash-ﬂow
growth is constant in nominal terms.
2.2 Cross-sectional implications of the money illusion
While previous research has tested the aggregate time-series predictions of the Modigliani-
Cohn money-illusion hypothesis, the cross-sectional implications of this hypothesis
have been largely unexplored in either the literature on behavioral ﬁnance theory or
the empirical literature in general. (The main exception is Ritter and Warr’s 2002
study, which examines the diﬀerential impact of inﬂa t i o no naﬁrm’s stock price as
a function of its ﬁnancial leverage.) We ﬁll this gap in the literature by developing
and testing cross-sectional predictions resulting from the original Modigliani-Cohn
hypothesis.
We base our cross-sectional predictions on three substantive assumptions. First,
we assume that the market suﬀers from money illusion of the type described by
equation (3). Second, we assume that the market makes no other type of systematic
mistake in valuing stocks. Together, these two assumptions imply that equation (3)
holds not only for the market but also for each individual stock:








i = γ0 + γ1π.
7An important result of these assumptions is that money-illusion’s inﬂuence on mis-
pricing is equal across stocks, i.e., εi ≡ εM = γ0 + γ1π.
Our ﬁnal assumption is that investors behave according to modern portfolio theory
in evaluating risks, that is, they use the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM to set require risk
premia. This implies that the slope of the relation between the subjective return












M . N o t et h a tw ei m p l i c i t l ya s s u m et h a tb e t a sa r ek n o w nc o n s t a n t s
so that subjective and objective expectations of betas are thus equal.
These assumptions allow us to derive the cross-sectional implication of the Modigliani-
Cohn [1979] money-illusion hypothesis. Substituting the subjective Sharpe-Lintner
CAPM into (4) yields:





Recognizing that market mispricing, εM, equals the wedge between objective and












M = εi − βiεM.
Above, αOBJ
i is an objective measure of relative mispricing, called Jensen’s [1968]
alpha in the ﬁnance literature. Since mispricing for both the market and stock i is
equal to the same linear function of expected inﬂation, γ0 + γ1π,w ec a nw r i t e
(8) α
OBJ
i = γ0 + γ1π − βi(γ0 + γ1π)
Equation (8) predicts that the (conditional) Jensen’s alpha of a stock is a linear
function of inﬂation, the stock’s beta, and the interaction between inﬂation and the
stock’s beta. If the market suﬀers from money illusion, then when inﬂation is high
a rational investor would perceive a positive alpha for low-beta stocks and negative
alpha for high-beta stocks. Conversely, when inﬂation is low (or negative), a rational
expectation of a stock’s alpha is negative for low-beta stocks and positive for high-beta
stocks.
8Recall that the security market line is the linear relation between a stock’s aver-
age return and its beta. Equivalently, equation (8) states that both the intercept
and the slope of the observed security market line deviate systematically from the
rational-expectation Sharpe-Lintner CAPM’s prediction. Moreover, this deviation
is a function of inﬂation. Deﬁne the excess slope of the security market line as the
cross-sectional slope of (objective) alpha on beta. Deﬁne the excess intercept of
the security market line as the (objective) alpha of a unit-investment stock portfolio
that has a zero beta. Equation (8) predicts that the excess intercept of the security
market line equals γ0 + γ1π and the excess slope equals −(γ0 + γ1π) under the joint
hypothesis of money illusion and the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.
The above reasoning assumes that prices are exclusively set by investors who suﬀer
from money illusion. What happens if some investors suﬀer from money illusion while
other investors do not, and the two groups interact in the market? In the Appendix,
we describe a very stylized equilibrium model, in which a fraction of the risk-bearing
capacity in the market suﬀers from money illusion. This stylized model gives an
intuitive prediction: The excess slope of the security market line is determined by the
product of inﬂation and the fraction of the market’s risk-bearing capacity controlled
by money-illusioned investors.
The above hypotheses tie in closely with recent research on equity-premium pre-
dictability and inﬂation. A paper by Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2004)
assumes that the CAPM holds in terms of investors’ subjective expectations, and
uses the relative prices of high and low beta stocks to derive an estimate of the sub-
jective equity premium. Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho ﬁnd that this estimate
correlates well with proxies for the objective equity premium such as the dividend
yield, and also has predictive power for the future equity premium. The major
exception to their ﬁnding occurs in the early 1980’s, when their subjective equity
premium measure is low but the dividend yield, as well as the subsequent aggregate
stock market return are both high. It is noteworthy that this period was also the
peak of U.S. inﬂation.
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2002) assume the validity of Polk, Thompson, and
Vuolteenaho’s (2004) measure of the subjective equity premium. Campbell and
Vuolteenaho combine this measure with the Gordon growth model for the aggregate
market to estimate the subjectively expected growth rate of aggregate cash ﬂows. It
appears that inﬂation drives a wedge between the subjective and objective estimates
of aggregate growth, just as predicted by the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis.
9In contrast, we essentially circle back to ask how money illusion aﬀects the objec-
tive validity of the CAPM. Even if investors subjectively use the CAPM, does the
CAPM describe the pattern of objective returns in the cross-section? The answer is
that there should be an objective security market line, but it can be steeper or ﬂatter
than the prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, i.e., the rational expectation of the
equity premium.
3 Empirical methodology and results
Our main tests examine time variation in the excess intercept and slope of the security
market line, and the relation of this time variation to inﬂation. Our estimation
strategy is the following. First, we construct dynamic stock portfolios that are likely
to show a large and consistent cross-sectional spread in their CAPM betas. The
natural way to construct such portfolios is to sort stocks into portfolios each month
on their past estimated stock-level betas. We record the returns on these value-weight
portfolios, which become our basis assets.
Speciﬁcally, we generate our basis asset returns from the Center for Research in Se-
curities Prices (CRSP) monthly stock ﬁle, which provides monthly prices; shares out-
standing; dividends; and returns for available NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.
We measure betas, b βi,t, for individual stocks using at least one and up to three years
of monthly returns in a market-model OLS regression on a constant and the con-
temporaneous return on the value-weight NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ portfolio.4 As we
sometimes estimate beta using only twelve returns, we censor each ﬁrm’s individual
monthly return to the range (-50 percent,100 percent) in order to limit the inﬂuence
of extreme ﬁrm-speciﬁc outliers. We use these stock-level estimates to form beta-
sorted portfolios. The portfolios are value-weight and reformed each month using
the most recent available betas. We consider sorts into 10, 20, and 40 portfolios.
The results are not sensitive to the number of portfolios, and we thus concentrate on
the 20-portfolio data set for most tests. These portfolio-return series span the 895
month period, 1927:06-2001:12.
Second, we estimate rolling betas on these 20 beta-sorted portfolios using a trailing
window of 36 months. (We have replicated our results using 24 and 48 month beta-
4We skip those months in which a ﬁrm is missing returns. However, we require all observations
to occur within a four-year window.
10estimation windows, and the results are robust to variation in window length.) We
denote the time series of these rolling betas as the “post-formation betas” of the
basis assets. These post-formation beta series span the 860 month period, 1930:05-
2001:12.
At this stage of the analysis, it is important to verify that our stock-level beta
estimates are actually useful and result in cross-sectional spread in the average post-
formation betas. We ﬁnd that they are, as the average post-formation beta of the
lowest beta portfolio is 0.63 while the post-formation beta of the highest beta portfolio
is 1.77. However, the estimated post-formation betas for a particular portfolio are
not constant through time. For the lowest beta portfolio, the post-formation beta
varies from -0.35 to 1.92, while the highest beta portfolio’s post-formation beta varies
from 0.59 to 3.63. Of course, most of this time-series variation in the post-formation
b e t a si ss i m p l yd u et os a m p l i n gv a r i a t i o n .
Third, we form two portfolios from these 20 basis assets using Fama and Macbeth’s
[1973] cross-sectional regression technique. The purpose of this step is to directly
control for the time-variation in post-formation betas documented above. Speciﬁcally,
for each cross section, we regress the future excess return on the 20 basis assets on a
constant and the portfolios’ trailing-window post-formation beta. As shown by Fama
and Macbeth [1973], the time series of these cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients are






















Above, 1 is a vector of constants and b β
t−1 a vector of post-formation betas of beta-
sorted portfolios estimated using a trailing window that ends at t−1. re
t is the vector
of excess returns on the beta-sorted portfolios.
We present the regression coeﬃcients in matrix notation in equation (9) to high-
light the fact that the cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients are portfolios. As long
as the trailing post-formation betas are accurate forecasts of future post-formation
betas, the intercept portfolio return will be the excess return on a unit-investment
zero-beta stock portfolio and the slope portfolio return will be the excess return on a
unit-beta zero-investment portfolio. Furthermore, these portfolio strategies are im-
plementable as long as the explanatory variables (i.e., the betas) are known in advance
11of the dependent variables (i.e., the basis-asset excess returns). The intercept and
slope portfolio have average returns of 41 and 21 basis points per month respectively,
though only the intercept portfolio’s mean return is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. These two excess-return series span the 859 month period, 1930:06-2001.
Though the steps taken so far are complicated, these complications are justiﬁed
as they will produce two portfolio return series with relatively constant, precisely-
measured betas of zero and one for the intercept and slope portfolios respectively.
This is desirable, as the time-series regressions in the next stage critically require
that the portfolios we use have constant betas.
Fourth, we regress the intercept and slope portfolio’s excess returns on a constant,
the contemporaneous market excess return, and lagged inﬂation. As above, we use the
value-weight NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ portfolio as our proxy of the market portfolio.
The excess return is computed by subtracting the three-month Treasury-bill rate from
CRSP. Our measure of inﬂation is the series used by Campbell and Vuolteenaho
[2004] in their study investigating aggregate market valuations and inﬂation. We
ﬁrst compute log growth rates on the producer price index. As these growth rates
are very noisy especially in the ﬁrst part of our sample, we smooth these log growth
rates by taking an exponentially weighted moving average with a half life of 36 months
(i.e., monthly decay to the power of 0.9806). Note that the exponentially-weighted
moving averages use trailing inﬂation data, so there is no look-ahead bias in our
smoothing. We also demean this inﬂation series using its full sample mean in order
that the subsequent regression parameters are easier for the reader to interpret.
The two time-series regressions (10) are analogous to Black, Jensen, and Scholes
[1972] and Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken [1989] time-series regressions with time-
varying Jensen’s [1968] alphas:
r
e
intercept,t = a1 + b1r
e
M,t + c1πt−1 + u1,t (10)
r
e
slope,t = a2 + b2r
e
M,t + c2πt−1 + u2,t
The empirical estimates of the two regression equations in (10) show that both port-
folios have very precisely measured betas. Table 1 shows that for our preferred
speciﬁcation (20 beta-sorted portfolios where post-formation betas are estimated us-
ing a 36-month trailing window), the intercept portfolio has a beta of 0.0041 with a
t-stat of 0.14 while the slope portfolio has a beta of 1.0205 with a t-stat of 34.38. We
also ﬁnd that the conditional alpha of the intercept portfolio varies positively with
lagged inﬂation as the estimate of c1 is 1.50 with a t-statistic of 2.41. Our estimate of
12c2 is reliably negative (value of -1.48, t-stat of -2.35) indicating that inﬂation tracks
the conditional alpha of the slope portfolio in an opposite fashion.
Because of our novel methodology, we now have identiﬁed two portfolios with
relatively stable betas. If we could be conﬁdent that the trailing-window post-
formation beta estimates are perfect forecasts of the future basis-asset betas, the
excess intercept and excess slope of the security market line would be given by a1 +
c1πt−1 and a2+c2πt−1. In that hypothetical case, the time-series regression coeﬃcients
b1 and b2 would be exactly equal to zero and one. Despite the usefulness of our
new approach, realistically speaking, the trailing-window betas we use as inputs of
the Fama-MacBeth stage will never be perfect forecasts of future betas; there is no
guarantee that b1 =0and b2 =1exactly. Since the point estimates are always
close for the basis assets we consider, our method is informative enough to allow us
to simply modify the formulas for the conditional excess intercept and excess slope
of the security market line to take these small deviations into account.
As we can conﬁdently reject the hypotheses that b2 =0and b2 = b1 for all sets
of basis assets, straightforward algebra provides the alphas of a zero-beta and a unit-
beta stock portfolio implied by the estimates of equation (10). The functions that
map estimates of the parameters in regression (10) into the parameters of equation
(8) are as follows. The excess slope of the security market line is
g0 + g1πt−1 (11)
g0 ≡ a2/b2
g1 ≡ c2/b2.
The excess intercept of the security market line is given by the function:
h0 + h1πt−1 (12)
h0 ≡ a1 − a2b1/b2
h1 ≡ c1 − c2b1/b2.
To summarize, these two formulas are the result of solving for the conditional alpha
of a zero-beta and a unit-beta portfolio implied by estimates of system (10).
It is important to note that equations (11) and (12) also provide a correction for
any potential measurement error problem caused by the use of estimated betas at the
Fama-Macbeth stage. Even if betas are estimated with error in earlier stages, our
ﬁnal estimates of the excess slope and the excess intercept of the security market line
are consistent.
13Table 2 reports the point estimates of the excess slope of the security market line.
We focus on the speciﬁcation using 20 portfolios and a 36-month beta-estimation
window in the Fama-MacBeth stage, but as the table shows, the results are robust to
small variations in these choices. Increasing the number of basis-asset portfolios in
the tests typically strengthens our results.
We estimate g0 as -0.0009 with a t-statistic of -0.40 and h0 as 0.0008 with a t-
statistic of 0.36. The interpretation of these near-zero intercept estimates is that
when inﬂation is at its mean, the empirical beta slope and the zero-beta rate among
stocks is consistent with the prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. In other words,
when inﬂation is at its time-series average, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM “works.” This
is consistent with a form of money illusion in which people use historical average
nominal growth rates to value the stock market, ignoring the current level of inﬂation
which may be very diﬀerent from inﬂation’s historical average.
Our estimate for g1 is -1.4487 with a t-statistic of -2.35. As predicted by the
Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, the excess slope of the security market line comoves
negatively with inﬂation. Our point estimates for the excess-intercept function are
also consistent with the predictions of the theory: The estimate of h1 is 1.5108 with a
t-statistic of 2.40, which is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero but not from
one. In words, we can reject the hypothesis that the market does not suﬀer from
money illusion, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that inﬂation is (irrationally)
fully priced into real stock yields. Furthermore, g1 is economically and statistically
very close to −h1, as predicted. Finally, we can reject the joint hypothesis that
both g1 =0and h1 =0against the two-sided alternative at the 5 percent level of
signiﬁcance.
3.1 Alternative robustness checks
We have also replicated our results with expanded sets of basis assets, presented
in Table 3. The ﬁrst panel uses 20 beta-sorted and 10 size-sorted portfolios as
basis assets. The second panel uses 20 beta-sorted and 10 book-to-market-sorted
portfolios as basis assets. The third and ﬁnal panel uses 20 beta-sorted, 10 size-
sorted, and 10 book-to-market-sorted portfolios as basis assets. The size-sorted
and book-to-market-sorted portfolios are provided by Ken French on his web site
at http:// mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/ faculty/ ken.french/ data_library.html,
which also documents the methods used to construct these portfolios. Adding these
14characteristics-sorted portfolios to the set of basis assets does not alter our basic
conclusions, as the point estimates remain close to those obtained in the earlier tests.
Thus we argue that our main conclusions are not sensitive to small changes in the set
of basis assets.
In unreported tests, we also examine the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis using long-
horizon returns. We use the same portfolios as in our previous tests, except we hold
the stocks for horizons ranging from three to sixty months. Our market return is
also compounded in the same way, and then the compounded three-month Treasury-
bill interest rate is subtracted. Smoothed inﬂa t i o ni ss c a l e dt ot h es a m et i m eu n i t s
as the returns. Other than the change in the holding period, the test procedure is
exactly the same as in the previous tests. We ﬁnd point estimates consistent with
the joint hypothesis of money illusion and the CAPM at the quarterly horizons and
at horizons of three years and ﬁve years. However, for intermediate horizons (12-
24 months), any eﬀect is small, with point estimates occasionally having the wrong
sign. Though unfortunate, the low power and large standard errors of these long-
horizon tests are at least partially to blame, as the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis is
never rejected statistically.
As part of our long-horizon tests, we also check to see whether our point esti-
mates of the cross-sectional eﬀect of money illusion are consistent with the aggregate
mispricing of stocks versus bonds by Campbell and Vuolteenaho [2004]. In partic-
ular, we estimate a regression forecasting the excess market return with smoothed
inﬂation, while controlling for the subjective risk-premium measure λ
SRC of Polk,
Thompson, and Vuolteenaho [2004]. As predicted by the Modigliani-Cohn hypoth-
esis, the partial regression coeﬃcient on inﬂation is positive, signiﬁcant, and similar
to our short-horizon cross-sectional estimate at all horizons.
Though we ﬁnd evidence of Modigliani and Cohn’s money illusion, our tests so
far have only considered the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. However, it is
theoretically possible that our results are simply due to an incorrect restriction on
the intercept of the security market line implicit in that version of the CAPM.
Black [1973] considers the possibility that investors cannot borrow at the Treasury-
bill rate. If so, the likely eﬀect of such inability to borrow is that the zero-beta rate
among stocks deviates from the Treasury-bill rate. In other words, the Black CAPM
allows the excess intercept and slope of the security market line to be non-zero.
Therefore, an alternate explanation for our ﬁndings is that the spread between the
true borrowing rate facing investors and the Treasury-bill rate comoves with inﬂation.
15Fortunately for our conclusions, data on actual borrowing rates indicates that the
spread does not comove positively with inﬂation. Our three empirical proxies for the
true borrowing rate are car-loan rates from commercial banks, personal-loan rates
from commercial banks, and credit-card interest rates. We obtain these quarterly
data from the Federal Reserve’s web site. The data from commercial banks begins
1972:02, while the credit-card rate data begins 1994:11. We ﬁrst compute the yield
spread between these loans and maturity-matched Treasury yields. We then regress
these spreads on smoothed inﬂation (in the same annualized units)
The regression results in Table 4 show that the yield spread between individuals’
borrowing rates and Treasury rates comoves negatively, not positively, with lagged
inﬂation. This result is not surprising, as Ausubel [1991] ﬁnds that credit-card inter-
est rates appear “sticky” in responding to changes in market interest rates. Thus, we
reject the Black CAPM as an alternative explanation for the observed time-variation
in the excess slope of the security market line.
We also consider subjective risk premia determined in a world where multiple
risk factors determine the cross-section of subjective expected returns. That is, we
assume a world in which investors mistakenly mis-estimate real cash-ﬂow growth of
(and thus expected returns on) all stocks due to money illusion, but otherwise price
stocks correctly in accordance with a multi-factor model. Furthermore, we assume
that measured betas are not materially aﬀected by this mispricing.
In our robustness checks below, we employ the well-known three-factor model of
Fama and French [1993], but the below steps will easily generalize to any multifactor
model for which the additional factors are expressed as long-short stock portfolios.
The equations given above for the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM case, and therefore the
regressions we will run to test the model and the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, easily
generalize to this case. We begin by replacing equation (5) with the multifactor beta








f is a column vector of factor realizations for the given period and δi is a column
vector of asset i’s multiple-regression loadings on those factors. Here we assume that
the factor-mimicking portfolios are long and short stocks in equal dollar amounts.
Under these conditions there is no need for SUBJ superscripts, as the inﬂation-
related mispricing aﬀects the yields of all stocks identically so that the expected
16return of any long-short stock portfolio is unaﬀected. Thus,























if = εi − βiεM.
αOBJ
i denotes the Jensen’s alpha relative to the multifactor model, and is almost
identical to the expression derived in the CAPM case, except that β is a multifactor
sensitivity on the market return:
(16) α
OBJ
i = γ0 + γ1π − βi(γ0 + γ1π)
In the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we now include as explanatory variables the
estimated loadings on all three factors, including multifactor market betas. Let the
additional non-market factor loadings be denoted by b δt−1 where b δt−1 has one row for
each asset and one column for each non-market factor. The returns on the intercept


























intercept,t represents the return (in excess of the riskless rate) on a portfolio anticipated
to have zero loadings on all factors (including the market) and a unit net investment
in stocks. re
slope,t, which is deﬁned as the ﬁrst element of re
allslopes,t, is the return on a
portfolio anticipated to have a unit market loading and a zero loadings on the other
factors. The remaining elements of re
allslopes,t, are returns on portfolios with unit
loadings on the other factors; they are not used in our subsequent analysis.
The actual factor loadings of the re
intercept,t and re
slope,t portfolios are again reason-
ably close to their hypothetical values. We observe this by regressing the time series
of returns on the factors, as well as on π,o u ri n ﬂation variable:
r
e




1ft + c1πt−1 + u1,t (18)
r
e




2ft + c2πt−1 + u2,t.
ft is a vector of factor realizations at time t. B1 and B2 are regression coeﬃcients on
the non-market factors. As above, in order to estimate the slope of the security mar-
k e tl i n ew en e e dt oa d j u s tt h ei n t e r c e p ta n ds l o p ep o r t f o l i o ss l i g h t l yt og e tp o r t f o l i o s
17that (in sample) actually have the necessary loadings. Again, the process of clean-
ing out any extraneous loadings on other factors conveniently leaves us with security
market line equations that are virtually identical to those in the CAPM case (except
that the b1 and b2 now come from the regression that includes the other factors (i.e.,
they are multifactor betas). The excess slope and excess intercept of the security
market line are again given by equations (11) and (12).
Table 5 contains our estimates for the Fama and French [1993] multi-factor model,
which contains two factors in addition to the market factor. The factor series are
provided by Ken French on his web site at http:// mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/
faculty/ ken.french/ data_library.html. The ﬁrst is SMB,t h ed i ﬀerence between
the return on small and big market-capitalization stocks. The second is HML,t h e
diﬀerence between the return on high and low book-to-market ratio stocks. In Table
5, we ﬁnd that the estimated g1 is close to 1, the estimated h1 is close to −1, and
the two are close to equal in absolute value but opposite in sign, just as predicted by
the Modigliani and Cohn hypothesis (and just as we found using the CAPM as the
risk model). For our preferred speciﬁcation (36 months in post-formation loading
regressions, 20 test asset portfolios) we obtain point estimates of -1.28 for g1 (t-
statistic of -1.75) and 1.28 for h1 (t-statistic of 1.71). The tests using the multifactor
model have less power, but we can still reject at the 10 percent level the hypothesis
that inﬂation plays no role in the determination of the cross-sectional beta premium.
The results for other speciﬁcations are qualitatively similar, as can be seen in Table
5.
4 Future research
Although this and other papers present comprehensive evidence on the eﬀect of money
illusion on expected stock returns, there are many other important ways in which
money illusion may manifest itself. As a consequence, many fruitful opportunities
for future research on the potential eﬀects of money illusion exist.
First, how does unexpected inﬂation relate to unexpected stock returns? A large
literature, beginning with Lintner (1975) and Fama and Schwert (1977), ﬁnds a neg-
ative relation between stock returns and inﬂation. Fama (1981), Fama and Gibbons
(1982), and Geske and Roll (1983) explain this result by arguing that an increase
(decrease) in real activity is expected to coincide with a decrease (increase) in inﬂa-
18tion. Stock prices, being forward-looking, incorporate the cash-ﬂow news associated
with a change in inﬂation. Our paper takes a static approach to thinking about
inﬂation, examining the price level of the market in diﬀerent inﬂation environments.
In a world in which investors have money illusion, unexpected inﬂation is likely to
d r i v em a r k e t sd o w n ,a n dt od r i v es o m es t o c k sd o w nm o r et h a no t h e r s . W o r k i n go u t
the eﬀects of unexpected inﬂation on the money illusion market is an exercise left
for future research. However, while we believe that studying unexpected inﬂation
may shed additional light on the impact of money illusion on the stock market, these
considerations are unlikely to provide an alternative explanation for our ﬁndings of
return predictability.
Second, companies are often ﬁnanced with nominal bonds, suggesting additional
rich testable implications in the response of stock prices to unexpected inﬂation. In
the absence of money illusion, the CAPM can be used to price the total assets of a
ﬁrm or just the ﬁrm’s equity. Assuming that betas are accurately estimated, changing
ﬁrm betas should not lead to CAPM failures in a rational market. However, leverage
eﬀects could conceivably combine with money illusion and unexpected inﬂation to
create anomalies in the market’s response to unexpected inﬂation. As Modigliani
and Cohn (1979) point out, when inﬂation unexpectedly increases, the equity value
of ﬁrms that have large amounts of long-term nominal debt should increase, at least
relative to a similar ﬁrm with short-term nominal debt or long-term real debt. The
absence of such a reaction would be anomalous. French, Ruback, and Schwert [1983]
and Ritter and Warr [2002] test this hypothesis, and ﬁnd little evidence for such a
relation, which is consistent with the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis.
The possible correlation between beta and leverage due to the presence of long-
term nominal debt in a ﬁrm’s capital structure might aﬀect our expected-return tests
as well. It is possible that during our sample period, negative shocks to inﬂation
tended to occur at times when inﬂation was high and positive shocks at times when
inﬂation was low. In this case, we would observe ex-post relatively strong perfor-
mance by high-leverage ﬁrms at low inﬂation times and ex-post weak performance
by these ﬁrms when inﬂation is high. Furthermore, if high-leverage ﬁrms have high
equity betas, this eﬀect could generate empirical ﬁndings similar to ours. Compre-
hensively eliminating this possiblity would require currently unavailable long-term
data on investor inﬂation expectations and company leverage ratios, and is thus left
to future research.
Third, money illusion is most likely to occur in markets that are diﬃcult to ar-
19bitrage and that contain a large number of ﬁnancially unsophisticated participants.
Based on these characteristics, money illusion might be predicted to have strong ef-
fects in the market for residential real estate. The market for residential real estate
also has very large sums at stake, both at the level of the individual consumer and in
the aggregate, making it a particularly interesting market to study. Analogous to our
observations in ﬁnancial markets, real estate prices would be expected to become too
high (relative to expected future rents) when nominal interest rates are low, and too
low when nominal interest rates are high, regardless of the real interest rates at those
times. Of course, it is the real rate that is important in the decision between renting
and purchasing a home, at least if one makes the plausible assumption that rents rise
with inﬂation. In our ongoing research, we are testing to see whether money illusion
appears to be a feature of the real estate market.
We know of no paper that tests for money illusion as such in real estate prices.
However, there is a literature that looks at the relation between inﬂation (especially
shocks to inﬂation) and real estate prices. Two such papers are by Chan, Hendershott
and Sanders (1990) and Liu, Hartzell and Hoesh (1997), who ﬁnd that real values of
real-estate investments respond negatively to inﬂation, at least in the short run.
Fourth, the United States has experienced a relatively small number of high- and
low-inﬂation cycles in the past hundred years. Consequently, any test based on
inﬂa t i o nl e v e l si sl i k e l yt os u ﬀer from relatively low statistical power. One obvious
solution to this problem essentially provides more data by examining international
m a r k e t sa sw e l l ,b e c a u s em a n yi n t e r n a t i o n a lm a r k e t sh a v ee x p e r i e n c e dm a n ym o r e
periods of unusually high or low inﬂation. Cohn and Lessard (1980) tested the
Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis using aggregate markets in a number of countries and
found results consistent with the hypothesis. In a recent paper, Sellin (2001) reviews
related evidence on the eﬀects of money and inﬂation on stock prices.
Besides using international markets as an additional source of variation in inﬂation
with which to test our main hypotheses, we can also develop additional cross-sectional
hypotheses about the diﬀerences between international markets. For example, we
might predict that in countries that have experienced exceedingly high and volatile
inﬂation, people will be unlikely to suﬀer from money illusion when valuing stocks
since inﬂation is so central a part of daily life and commerce.
Fifth, economists have long maintained that investor welfare could be improved if
governments were to issue real rather than nominal bonds. Such “inﬂation-indexed”
bonds have existed for some time in the United Kingdom and other countries, and
20in the last decade have come into existence in the United States as well. In our
model, and in the thinking that underlies our analysis, we focus on investors choosing
between stocks and nominal bonds. An area for future research is the introduction
of inﬂation-indexed bonds and the impact that the existence of these bonds have
on investors who would otherwise suﬀer from money illusion. Would the existence
of such bonds in the market aﬀect equilibrium prices of stocks in a way that either
mitigates or exacerbates the eﬀects observed here? Is it possible that the presence
of such bonds in the market would serve to remind investors of the importance of
inﬂation and in some way reduce money illusion generally? We plan to examine
these questions in future work.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Do people suﬀer from money illusion when the stakes are high and the consequences of
their decisions are signiﬁcant? While we may disagree on the answer to this question,
its importance is indisputable. If people suﬀer from money illusion, it is likely that
this bias will be most important in valuing long-term contracts. Many important
decisions, such as choosing between buying and renting a home or allocating one’s
portfolio between stocks and nominal bonds, depend critically on the decision-maker’s
ability to distinguish between nominal and real quantities.
Modigliani and Cohn [1979] suggest that stock-market investors suﬀer from money
illusion. With trillions of dollars at stake, the stock and bond markets are among
the most important markets for long-term contracts. Previous time-series studies
have found that high inﬂation coincides with low prices for stocks relative to bonds.
This relation may be caused by money illusion; however, as noted by Campbell and
Vuolteenaho [2004], it may also be caused by the real discount rates used by investors
being positively correlated with inﬂation.
We present novel cross-sectional evidence supporting Modigliani and Cohn’s hy-
pothesis that the market does in fact suﬀer from money illusion. Simultaneously
examining the future returns of Treasury bills, safe stocks, and risky stocks allows us
to distinguish money illusion from any change in the attitudes of investors towards
risk. The key insight underlying our tests is that money illusion will have a symmet-
ric eﬀect on all stocks’ future returns, regardless of their exposure to systematic risk.
This constant eﬀect is in contrast to the impact of investor risk attitudes on future
21stock returns, which is proportional to the stock’s risk, as risky stocks’ future returns
will be aﬀected much more than safe stocks’ future returns. This insight allows us
to cleanly separate the two competing eﬀects.
Our empirical tests support the Modigliani-Cohn money-illusion hypothesis. When
inﬂation is high, a stock provides higher than justiﬁed future returns relative to short-
term bonds, irrespective of the riskiness of the particular stock. This constant eﬀect
across stocks varies approximately one-for-one with the rate of inﬂation.
A critical assumption in our tests is that investors use the Sharpe-Lintner capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) to evaluate the risk of a stock. Our cross-sectional
tests leverage this Sharpe-Lintner CAPM assumption by noting that any eﬀect of
risk attitudes on a stock’s price would have to result in an expected-return eﬀect that
is proportional to the stock’s CAPM beta. As a consequence, our ﬁndings could be
due to investors caring about some other risk than CAPM beta. We alleviate this
concern by ﬁnding support for the money-illusion hypothesis using an alternative
multi-factor model of risk. Nevertheless, one may never completely rule out the
possibility of our results being due to a misspeciﬁed model of risk.
In addition to showing that stock-market investors suﬀer from money illusion, our
results oﬀer a partial explanation for the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM’s poor empirical per-
formance in recent samples. In an inﬂuential paper, Fama and French [1992] fail to
ﬁnd support for “the central prediction of [the CAPM], that average returns are pos-
itively related to market [betas].” Curiously, this negative results is primarily driven
by their 1951-1960 and 1981-1990 subsamples. In the beginning of both subsamples
inﬂation was very high. The cross-sectional implication of the Modigliani-Cohn hy-
pothesis is that those are precisely the times when the slope of expected returns on
beta observed in the data should be much lower than the equity premium. In a sense,
money illusion may have killed the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM in those subsamples.
Although we do not explicitly consider money illusion’s eﬀect on investor wel-
fare, we believe that our results nevertheless have some policy implications, however
speculative. First, if investors suﬀer from money illusion, stable and low inﬂation is
likely to result in a less mispriced stock market than volatile and high inﬂation. To
the extent that real investment decisions are inﬂuenced by stock-market valuations,
one would expect less stock market mispricing to be beneﬁcial to the economy in the
long run. Not only will market prices be more informative about investment op-
portunities, but also any catering (through a ﬁrm’s choice of business investment) to
22mispricing that occurs because managers have short horizons will be reduced.5 Sec-
ond, if government borrowing shifts from nominal bonds to inﬂation-indexed or real
bonds, it is possible that the stock market will value stocks relative to real (instead
of nominal) bonds, eliminating the eﬀect of money illusion on stock prices. Third,
and most importantly, to the extent that investors perceive a beneﬁt from valuing
stocks using nominal quantities, they should pay more attention to inﬂation when
forecasting future nominal cash-ﬂows.
6 Appendix
In this appendix, we present a stylized model of market equilibrium, where some
investors suﬀer from money illusion and others do not. The model gives a sim-
ple prediction: The diﬀerence between the equity premium and the cross-sectional
beta premium (i.e., the slope of the security market line) is equal to cπ/(1 + π),
where π i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation and c is a measure of the risk-bearing capacity of
money-illusioned investors relative to that of rational investors. On the one hand,
as expected, if money-illusioned investors have all of the risk-bearing capacity in the
economy, inﬂation translates almost one-for-one into the excess slope of the security
market line. On the other hand, also as expected, if rational investors have all of
the risk-bearing capacity, then the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM holds. For intermediate
cases, the excess slope of the security-market line depends linearly on the share of
risk-bearing capacity of the two investor groups.
The model has two periods, denoted by 0 and 1. At time 0, the investors trade
but do not consume. At time 1, investors consume the payoﬀs from their portfolios,
and there is no trading.
There are three traded assets, one nominal bond (asset indexed 1) in zero net
supply and two stocks (assets indexed 2 and 3) both with one share outstanding.
Price of these assets at time 0 are p1, p2,a n dp3. Because we have no consumption
5Dow and Gorton [1997] model the connection between stock market eﬃciency and economic
eﬃciency. Shleifer and Vishny [1990] study the importance of managers and ﬁrms having short
horizons. Stein [1996] focuses on the link between market ineﬃciency and ﬁrm’s real investment
policies, modeling how an ineﬃcient capital market can result in managers catering to market mis-
pricing. Polk and Sapienza [2004] document catering eﬀects in ﬁrm’s capital expenditures related
to mispricing.
23at time 0, asset prices have meaning only in relative terms. We set p1 =1as an
arbitrary normalization, interpreting all relative to the nominal bond’s price.
The asset payoﬀs are as follows. The nominal debt has no default risk. The rate
of inﬂation, π, is known, and the nominal debt is thus risk-free in real terms as well.
The real payoﬀ to the debt is X1 = F/(1 + π), where F is the nominal face value of
the bond. Set F =1without any loss of generality, and thus the real debt payoﬀ is
X1 =1 /(1 + π).
The second asset is the stock of a relatively safe company and the third asset
is a relatively risky company’s stock. The real payoﬀs to the second asset and the
third asset are e X2 and e X3. For simplicity, we make the expected payoﬀsf o rb o t h
assets equal, that is, E( e X2)=E( e X3)=X. The uncertain future values of real
assets are independent random variables with known variances var( e X2)=σ2 and
var( e X3)=kσ2, k>1. In particular, these real payoﬀsd on o td e p e n do nt h er a t eo f
inﬂation π.T h e r e a l p a y o ﬀ to the market portfolio of all assets is thus e X2 + e X3 and
the real return on the market portfolios is ( e X2 + e X3)/(p2 +p3). The nominal return
on the market portfolios is (1 + π)( e X2 + e X3)/(p2 + p3).
Suppose two investors (or groups of investors), denoted by A and B, have mean-
variance preferences over time 1 consumption and behave competitively as price tak-
ers. Initially, the assets are endowed evenly between the two groups of investors.
Both investors maximize a mean-variance objective function, but in addition investor
Bs u ﬀers from money illusion.
Investor A has an absolute risk-bearing capacity of (1 − c), 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. Investor
Ad o e sn o ts u ﬀer from money illusion, perceives the above real payoﬀs correctly, and
maximizes the mean-variance preference of time-1 consumption:



























subject to the budget constraint .5(p2 + p3)=w1 + p2w2 + p3w3 by choosing his
















The idea that investor B suﬀers from money illusion manifests itself in two ways.
First, investor B maximizes mean-variance preferences over nominal wealth. Second,
investor B believes that the nominal growth in the value of corporate assets is a
r a n d o mv a r i a b l ew i t had i s t r i b u t i o nt h a td o e sn o td e p e n do nt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation. In
other words, the investor B perceives nominal payoﬀs XB1 = F =1 , e XB2 = e X2, and
e XB3 = e X3, irrespective of the inﬂation environment. We set the risk-bearing capacity
of investor class B to c, which has the advantace of keeping the risk-bearing capacity
of the economy as a whole constant as c changes. Thus, investor B maximizes
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In the equilibrium the asset market clears, and one share of both assets must be
held by both investors:






























These prices makes sense: If money-illusioned investors dominate the market (i.e.,
c =1 ), then the price of a real asset in relation to the price of a nominal asset does
not change with the rate of inﬂation.

















The return on the market portfolio is
e X2+ e X3



























The expected equity premium, or the expected return on the market portfolio less
that on a risk-free asset, is
(28) θ =
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In words, the excess slope of the security market line (−cπ/(1 + π))i sd e t e r m i n e d
by the product of inﬂation and the fraction of the market’s risk-bearing capacity
controlled by money-illusioned investors.
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30Table 1: Time-series regressions of intercept and slope portfolios
The table shows OLS regressions of the intercept portfolio’s (re
intercept,t)a n dt h es l o p e
portfolio’s(re
slope,t) excess return on a constant, contemporaneous excess market return
(re
M,t), and demeaned lagged inﬂation (πt−1).
r
e
intercept,t = a1 + b1r
e
M,t + c1πt−1 + u1,t
r
e
slope,t = a2 + b2r
e
M,t + c2πt−1 + u2,t
The intercept and slope portfolios are constructed using Fama-Macbeth [1973] regres-
sions of excess returns on N beta sorted portfolios on a constant and the portfolios’
lagged K-month post-formation betas. T-statistics are in parentheses. R2 is ad-
justed for degrees of freedom. The regressions are estimated from the sample period
1930:06-2001:12, 859 monthly observations.
KN a 1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2 R2
intercept R2
slope
36 20 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0041 1.0205 1.5048 -1.4784 0.44% 58.03%
(0.36) (-0.40) (0.14) (34.38) (2.41) (-2.35)
36 10 0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0344 1.0558 1.4588 -1.4151 0.49% 57.69%
(0.33) (-0.40) (-1.12) (34.15) (2.23) (-2.16)
36 40 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0575 0.9732 1.5099 -1.5722 1.02% 58.58%
(0.33) (-0.21) (2.07) (34.75) (2.57) (-2.65)
24 20 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0589 0.9641 1.6340 -1.5561 1.12% 57.19%
(-0.06) (-0.03) (2.10) (34.02) (2.73) (-2.57)
48 20 0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0163 1.0394 1.2269 -1.2224 0.22% 57.23%
(0.70) (-0.72) (-0.53) (33.55) (1.86) (-1.85)
31Table 2: Excess intercept and slope of the security market
The table shows the estimated function that maps inﬂation into the excess slope
and intercept of the security market line. First, we regress the intercept portfolio’s
(re
intercept,t) and the slope portfolio’s (re
slope,t) excess return on a constant, contempo-
r a n e o u se x c e s sm a r k e tr e t u r n( re
M,t), and lagged inﬂation (πt−1).
r
e
intercept,t = a1 + b1r
e
M,t + c1πt−1 + u1,t
r
e
slope,t = a2 + b2r
e
M,t + c2πt−1 + u2,t
The intercept and slope portfolios are constructed using Fama-Macbeth [1973] regres-
sions of excess returns on N beta sorted portfolios on a constant and the portfolios’
lagged K-month post-formation betas. Second, we compute the functions that map
the regression parameters to the excess slope and intercept of the security market line.
The excess slope is deﬁned as g0+g1πt−1,w h e r eg0 ≡ a2/b2 and g1 ≡ c2/b2. The excess
intercept is computed as h0 +h1πt−1,w h e r eh0 ≡ a1 −a2b1/b2 and h1 ≡ c1 −c2b1/b2.
t-statistics computed using the delta method are in parentheses. We also report
the test statistic and the two-sided p-values [in brackets] for the hypotheses that
[g1,h 1]0 =[ 0 ,0]0 and g1 + h1 =0 . The regressions are estimated from the sample
period 1930:06-2001:12, 859 monthly observations.
KN g 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 20 -0.0009 -1.4487 0.0008 1.5108 5.82 0.00
(-0.40) (-2.35) (0.36) (2.40) [0.05] [0.96]
36 10 -0.0009 -1.3403 0.0007 1.4126 5.20 0.00
(-0.40) (-2.16) (0.33) (2.23) [0.07] [0.95]
36 40 -0.0004 -1.6155 0.0007 1.6029 7.12 0.00
(-0.21) (-2.64) (0.32) (2.57) [0.03] [0.99]
24 20 -0.0001 -1.6140 -0.0001 1.7290 8.37 0.01
(-0.06) (-2.56) (-0.05) (2.71) [0.02] [0.93]
48 20 -0.0016 -1.1761 0.0016 1.2077 3.46 0.00
(-0.72) (-1.85) (0.71) (1.86) [0.18] [0.98]
32Table 3: Results from expanded asset sets
The table shows the estimated function that maps inﬂation into the excess slope and
intercept of the security market line, estimated from expanded asset sets. First,
we regress the intercept portfolio’s (re
intercept,t)a n dt h es l o p ep o r t f o l i o ’ s( re
slope,t)e x -





intercept,t = a1 + b1r
e
M,t + c1πt−1 + u1,t
r
e
slope,t = a2 + b2r
e
M,t + c2πt−1 + u2,t
The intercept and slope portfolios are constructed using Fama-Macbeth [1973] re-
gressions of excess returns on basis-asset portfolios on a constant and the portfolios’
lagged K-month post-formation betas. Second, we compute the functions that map
the regression parameters to the excess slope and intercept of the security market line.
The excess slope is deﬁned as g0+g1πt−1,w h e r eg0 ≡ a2/b2 and g1 ≡ c2/b2. The excess
intercept is computed as h0 +h1πt−1,w h e r eh0 ≡ a1 −a2b1/b2 and h1 ≡ c1 −c2b1/b2.
t-statistics computed using the delta method are in parentheses. We also report
the test statistic and the two-sided p-values [in brackets] for the hypotheses that
[g1,h 1]0 =[ 0 ,0]0 and g1 + h1 =0 . The regressions are estimated from the sample
period 1930:06-2001:12, 859 monthly observations.
20 beta-sorted and 10 ME-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 0.0005 -1.6660 0.0002 1.5911 6.94 0.00
(0.22) (-2.55) (0.07) (2.41) [0.03] [0.95]
20 beta-sorted and 10 BE/ME-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 0.0001 -1.9251 -0.0000 2.0335 10.90 0.01
(0.03) (-3.12) (-0.02) (3.23) [0.00] [0.93]
20 beta-sorted, 10 ME-sorted, and 10 BE/ME-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 0.0012 -2.0503 -0.0007 2.0644 9.86 0.00
(0.52) (-3.13) (-0.30) (3.13) [0.01] [0.99]
33Table 4: Inﬂation and the spread between borrowing and Treasury rates
The table regresses proxies for the spread between borrowing rates that individuals
face and Treasury rates on lagged inﬂation. The inﬂation series (π) is the smoothed
inﬂation used in earlier tests, annualized by multiplying the series by 12. The t-
statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors computed using four lags and
leads. The heading of each panel speciﬁes the spread measure being used as the
dependent variable. Data are quarterly.
48 month car loans from commerical banks,
spread over the 48-month T-note yield
constant (t-stat) slope on π (t-stat) Adj. R2 N
3.4327 (13.9) -0.0489 (-0.9) 0.01 124
24 month personal loans from commerical banks
spread over the 24-month T-note yield
constant (t-stat) slope on π (t-stat) Adj. R2 N
9.2135 (29.4) -0.5596 (-7.9) 0.58 124
Credit card accounts (interest rates),
spread over the 90-day T-bill yield
constant (t-stat) slope on π (t-stat) Adj. R2 N
11.4532 (22.8) -0.4270 (-2.0) 0.15 33
Credit card accounts (assessed interest),
spread over the 90-day T-bill yield
constant (t-stat) slope on π (t-stat) Adj. R2 N
11.1719 (21.1) -0.4547 (-2.0) 0.12 33
34Table 5: Results for the Fama-French three-factor model
The table repeats the tests of Table 2 using the Fama-French [1993] three-factor model
in place of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. First, we regress the excess returns on the
basis-asset portfolios on a constant and the portfolios’ lagged K-month post-formation
factor loadings. The intercept portfolio’s (re
intercept,t) and the slope portfolio’s (re
slope,t)
excess returns are the coeﬃcient time series corresponding to the intercept and the
three-factor model’s market loading, respectively. Second, we regress these returns
on a constant, contemporaneous factor returns, and lagged inﬂation (πt−1).
r
e






HML,t + c1πt−1 + u1,t
r
e






HML,t + c2πt−1 + u2,t
The excess slope is deﬁned as g0 + g1πt−1,w h e r eg0 ≡ a2/b2,1 and g1 ≡ c2/b2,1.
The excess intercept is deﬁned as h0 + h1πt−1,w h e r eh0 ≡ a1 − a2b1,1/b2,1 and h1 ≡
c1−c2b1,1/b2,1. T-statistics computed using the delta method are in parentheses. We
also report the test statistic and the two-sided p-values [in brackets] for the hypotheses
that [g1,h 1]0 =[ 0 ,0]0 and g1+h1 =0 . The regressions are estimated from the sample
period 1930:06-2001:12, 859 monthly observations.
20 beta-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 0.0003 -1.2788 -0.0003 1.2787 3.13 0.00
(0.11) (-1.75) (-0.13) (1.71) [0.21] [1.00]
20 beta-sorted and 10 ME-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 -0.0018 -0.9980 0.0018 1.0099 2.30 0.00
(-0.76) (-1.51) (0.75) (1.52) [0.32] [0.99]
20 beta-sorted and 10 BE/ME-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 -0.0014 -0.9099 0.0009 0.9615 2.28 0.00
(-0.40) (-3.12) (0.35) (1.36) [0.32] [0.99]
20 beta-sorted, 10 ME-sorted, and 10 BE/ME-sorted portfolios
Kg 0 g1 h0 h1 [g1,h 1]0 =0 g1 + h1 =0
36 -0.0014 -1.1630 0.0012 1.1950 3.54 0.00
(-0.62) (-1.80) (0.60) (1.84) [0.17] [0.98]
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Figure 1: The empirical relation between average excess returns and beta in diﬀerent
inﬂation environments.
We ﬁrst create ten portfolio by sorting stocks on their past estimated betas.
We then record the excess returns on these portfolios. Next, we sort months in our
1927:06-2001:12 sample into four groups based on lagged inﬂation (deﬁned as the
smoothed change in the producer price index). For each group, we then estimate
the post-formation betas and average excess returns. The average annualized excess
returns (y-axis) and betas (x-axis) of these portfolios form the graphs. The solid
line (drawn from the [0,0] to [1, average market’s excess return in this subsample]) is
the relation predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. The dashed line is the ﬁtted
line computed by regressing the average returns on betas in each subsample.
36